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THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA: PRECEDENTS IN AMERICAN
LEGAL DIPLOMACY FOR THE SOCIALIST STATES' CLAIM OF RIGHT
I
INTRODUCTION
A. International Law and the Use of Force
The struggle of public international law to regulate national
policies which countenance the threat or use of force has met with
much frustration. The proscription of the unilateral use of force
to advance a state's interests has never been fully respected. In
addition, the decade of the 1960's has revealed a trend of legal
argument even more inimical to international order: the claim of
multilateral authority to employ regional armed forces, not only
to settle international disputes, but also to resolve matters
within a neighbor-state's domestic affairs.
1
The Soviet-led invasion of Czechoslovakia2 in the summer
of 1968 caused considerable consternation among proponents of
the rule of law in international affairs. In justification, the
Soviet Union proclaimed a class interpretation of international
law, based on the interests and rights of socialism. This note
will examim the elements of this recent Soviet interpretation
of international law by drawing upon the record of American legal
diplomacy for the "precedents" it discloses for the Soviet claim
of socialist "right" to fornibly intervene in Czechoslovakia.
1The concept that territorial propinquity may create special
relationships between states is not new. See Wright, Territorial
Propinguity,12 A.J.I.L. 519 (1918). What is new is the trend
towards making multilateral claims of international legal "right"
to intervene in a neighbor-state's affairs.
2While frequently referred to as "the Soviet invasion,"
armed units from Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, and Poland
also participated in the invasion.
B. The Principles of Reciprocity and Precedent in Legal Diplomacy
Of those concepts of equity carried into the realm of inter-
national law and relations from the national systems of law, the
principle of reciprocity seems to be one of the most pervasive.
It has implicitly dominated tariff negotiations for decades. Every
delegate to a convention to reduce tariffs is wary lest some other
state win trade advantages which would not be reciprocally avail-
able for his state. 3 The principle of reciprocity is the basis of
the compulsory jurisdiction clause of the Statute of the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant, was
referring to the principle of reciprocity in its general sense
when he stated:
If a particular regional organization considers itself
competent to perform certain functions by way of en-
forcement in its own region, I am afraid that the same
principle should be applicable to other regional organ-
izations too. 5
The idea implicit in the reciprocity principle in state diplomacy is
that no state should claim for itself a broader range of inter-
national rights than it is willing to concede to others. Thus,
one state's claim of legal right can become a precedent for the
claims of other states which seek to exercise the same rights.
The United States has recognized the persuasiveness of such
precedents and has employed them in its legal diplomacy.
6
One example is the response of the United States to the Soviet
assertion that the exclusion of Cuba from representation in
the Organization of American States in 1962 was unlawful. The
3J. EVANS, UNITED STATES TRADE POLICY 29-4o (1967).
4 I.C.J. STAT. art. 36, para. 2.
5N.Y. Times, May 28, 1965.
6The term "legal diplomacy" as used throughout this note
refers to that aspect of state diplomacy which is characterized
by the use of claims and assertions based on principles of
international law. Simply stated, legal diplomacy is diplomacy
carried on by the use of legal argument.
United States argued that the Soviet Union had earlier supported
the principle of such an exclusion by its vote to exclude the
Trujillo regime in the Dominican Republic. For some, that refer-
ence to the prior Soviet legal assertion carried almost the weight
that the citing of a pertinent Judicial precedent would carry in
a common law proceeding.
7
By the operation of the reciprocity principle the earlier
action or argument adds to the justification for, or diminishes
the disapproval of, the action or argument under review. It is
in this sense that "precedents" for the socialist states' claim
of "right" to intervene in Czechoslovakia are found both in the
antecedents and in recent applications of American legal diplomacy.
II
THE SOVIET JUSTIFICATION
FOR THE INVASION OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA
The first explanation offered by the Soviet Union for its
invasion of Czechoslovakia in August 1968, was that its assistance
was invited by unidentified Czech government and party leaders.
The Czechs, dsspite their subjection to military occupation, saw
some humor in the situation. An apt characterization of the fail-
ure of the first Soviet justification quickly spread across
occupied Czechoslovakia: "What are 600,000 foreign troops doing
in our country? Why, they are looking for someone who 'invited'
them."
A more elaborate argument of legal justification appeared
in a Pravda8 article entitled "Socialist and International Duties
7 See Security Council debates on this issue in 17 U.N. SCOR,
1017th meeting 2-23 (1962); 17 U.N. SCOR, 1018th meeting 2-20
(1962); 17 U.N. SCOR, 1020th meeting 2-17 (1962).
8 Pravda is the official Communist Party newspaper in which
unsigned articles speak for the party leadership. The cited ar-
ticle, signed by S. Kovalev, a member of the Pravda staff, is
somewhat less authoritative. It appears, nevertheless, that
Kovalev expressed the views of the Soviet leadership.
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of Socialist Countries," which presented the following points:
9
1. "The socialist states respect the democratic norms
of international law.... "
2. But, "[f]ormal judicial reasoning must not over-
shadow a class approach to the matter. One who
does it... begins to measure events with a yard-
stick of bourgeois law."
3. "... world socialism is the common gain of the work-
ing people of all lands; it is indivisible and its
defense is the common cause of all Communists.... "
4. The forces for "democratization"1 0 in Czechoslovakia
represented a movement towards that country's "de-
tachment from the socialist community." Such "anti-
socialist" forces were not properly contained by
the Czech authorities.
5. The anti-socialists in Czechoslovakia were "supported"
by "world imperialism."
6. "Self-determination" in Czechoslovakiaiwould have
meant the enabling of NATO forces to approach to
the Soviet border, encroaching upon socialist vital
interests.
7. After peaceful measures to control the Czech "anti-
socialists" failed, armed forces were sent in to
help protect the country's socialist sovereignty
from the threat of anti-socialism.
Thus, the Soviet justification asserted only nominal respect
for international law by declaring that a class approach must
prevail over a judicial approach. World socialism was presented
as the "world good" which is to be defended against all competi-
tors by all socialists. Formal legal principles, the Pravda
article asserted, do not restrict socialist action against anti-
socialists.
Although such arguments might strike the casual observer
of legal diplomacy as unprecedented and totally incredible,
9Pravda, Sept. 25, 1968. For an English translation by
the Soviet press agency, Novosti,see N.Y. Times, Sept. 27, 1968,
at 3.1 0See Czechs Look West, BUS. WEEK, May 18, 1968 at 38-39;
see also View from Bratislava, REPORTER, June 13, 1968 at 14-17.
there are striking precedents for just such arguments both in
early and in recent United States legal diplomacy. There is
perhaps no better starting place than with that early and enig-
matically enduring dogma of American diplomacy--the Monroe Doctrine.
III
PRECEDENTS IN THE MONROE DOCTRINE
Dexter Perkins, an authority on the Monroe Doctrine, begins
his history of the Doctrine by stating: "The Monroe Doctrine, in
its broad lines, is a prohibition on the part of the United States
against the extension of European influence and power to the New
World."1 1 Early in its history the United States sought to make
the New World an area of its own undisturbed dominance. Any
extended European activity in the hemisphere, unless approved
by the United States, was regarded as improper foreign inter-
vention in American affairs. Thus, from its beginnings, the
United States proclaimed that no state had a right to threaten
its interests.
1 2
In 1870, President Grant formulated the "no-transfer"
principle as an addition to the Monroe Doctrine. He declared,
"I now deem it proper to assert the equally important principle
that hereafter no territory on this continent shall be regarded
as subject to transfer to an European power. '11 3
Weighing the validity of Grant's doctrine today--a century
after its issuance--Perkins concludes:
Such a corollary receives today, it is fair to say,
the adhesion of the large proportion of the people
of the United States. Its reason and logic appeal
to most of us. The author of this volume is prepared
to endorse it. But we must not blind ourselves to
unpleasant facts with regard to it. Obviously, the
Grant doctrine, if we are to call it that, is a pro-
1 1D. PERKINS, A HISTORY OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE 4 (1963).
1 2See T. BAILEY, A DIPLOMATIC HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE
189 (1957.
13MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789-1897, 4016
(3. Richardson, 1899).
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hibition upon acts of peaceable transfer which may be
perfectly legal in themselves. It is in derogation of
the sovereignty of European nations; it can rest only
upon an inherent right of self-defense, upon the exist-
ence of a vital national interest. On this ground we
must sustain it, and on this ground aloneolk (Emphasis
added)
Insofar as this doctrine expresses present American policy, the
Soviet Union is given a more modern precedent as well as an his-
torical one (extra-legal, to be sure) for the derogation of inter-
natioDal duties and legal principles in favor of the principle of
"vital national interest." This precedent had an echo, if not
a progeny, in the Pravda article's reference to the threat of
NATO forces being able to approach Soviet borders, thus en-
croaching upon socialist vital interests.
Dexter Perkins quite appropriately and without undue subtlety
ilustrates the extra-legal bases of the concept of Secretary of
State Richard Olney and others that the United States has a
unique right in the Americas, Perkins states:
The declaration that the republics of Latin America
were "by geographic proximity (sic!), by natural
sympathy (sic!), by similarity of governmental con-
stitutions" (sic!) the "friends and allies" of the
United States carried with it some exaggeration. Nor
would these republics, jealous of their own indepen-
dence as they were, accept without some demur the
assertion that "the United States is practically
sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon
the subjects to which it confines its interposition.1"1 5
[The "sic's" are Perkins'.]
President Cleveland reasserted the myth of "right" or le-
gality of United States' intervention in her neighbor-states'
affairs in a message to Congress on December 17, 1895. He defended
the Monroe Doctrine as finding "its recognition in those princi-
ples of international law which are based upon the theory that
every nation shall have its rights protected, and its just claims
enforced. J6
14D. PERKINS, supra note 11, at 159.
1 51d. at 175.
16dId. at 179.
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The "right" of the United States to intervene in a neighbor-
state's affairs was the first legislative enactment sanctioning
the Platt Amendment1 7 to the Army Appropriation Bill of 1901.18
The amendment asserted the right of the United States to inter-
vene in Cuba "for the preservation of Cuban independence, ,
and for discharging its [the United States'] obligations with
respect to Cuba." By changing "United States" to "socialist
states" and "Cuba" to "Czechoslovakia," it can be argued that the
Congressional action of 1901 places the 1968 logic of the Soviet
justification into American law.
Three years later, in 1904, President Theodore Roosevelt
announced the conditions for American non-intervention in Latin
America. The President declared that if a nation "knows how to
act with decency in industrial and political matters, if it keeps
order and pays its obligations, then it need fear no interference
from the United States.... The United States cannot ignore this
duty."1 9 Shortly thereafter the United States took over the
administration of customs in the Dominican Republic in an
application of the Roosevelt Corollary to that deviant neighbor-
state. The President ordered the United States Navy to stop any
revolt in the Dominican Republic.2 0 Teddy Roosevelt both thought
and acted under the premise that the United States had the right
to exercise the expedient of an international police power.
Indeed, United States foreign policy throughout the period
from 1823 to 1904 supplies some significant precedents for the
socialist right argument advanced by the Soviets in justification
for the Czech invasion. To be sure, these early precedents
aremore properly regarded as examples of traditional state di-
plomacy rather than strictly legal diplomacy; it is also noted
that they have been to some extent reversed by more recent Pan-
American developments, But it is interesting to observe how these
developments, which reversed the more traditional precedents of
1 7CONG. REC. 3145 (1901).
18Act of March 2, 1901, ch. 803, 31 Stat, 895,
1 9PRINGLE, THEODORE ROOSEVELT 294 (1931).
2 0BISHOP, THEODORE ROOSEVELT AND HIS TIME 434 (1902);
See PERKINS supra note 11, at 241.
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state diplomacy, laid the foundations for more recent precedents
in American legal diplomacy.
The United States ratified the principle of non intervention
which was put into the convention issuing from the Seventh Pan-
American Conference held in Montevideo in 1933. 2 1 At Buenos Aires
in 1936, that convention was reinforced by a protocol declaring
"inadmissible" the intervention of any American state in the
affairs of another "for whatever reason" and further providing
that every question of interpretation not settled through diplo-
matic channels should be submitted to conciliation arbitration,
or to adjudication. It, too, was ratified by the United States.2 2
By this action the United States seemed to be unequivocally
denying its claim of right to intervene which the Monroe Doctrine
had come to embody; it appeared that a new epoch in American
diplomacy was born.
In the 1938 Declaration of Lima, the American states re-
affirmed the concept of hemispheric solidarity and declared:
[The] peoples of America have achieved spiritual unity
through the similarity of their republican institu-
tions, unshakeable will for peace... and through their
absolute adherence to the principles of international
law, of the equal sovereignty of states and of indivi-
dual liberty without religious or racial prejudices. 2 3
The 1939 Pan-American Conference of Havana reaffirmed the
no-transfer principle and went further in binding the American
states to a common commitment to the principle of collective
security. In 1947, the American states again assembled for a
hemispheric conference, this time at Rio de Janiero.2 4 The
collective security principle was reaffirmed with the formation
2 1CONG. REC. 6496 (1937).
22Id. at 6494.
2 3N.Y. Times, June 6, 1940; see PERKINS supra note 11, at
952.
24 For an account of the Conference see N.Y. Times, August
31, 1947.
of the Pan American Union and the treaty 2 5 further provided
that a two-thirds vote could bind all the states to common
action against a law breaking member-state. No state, however,
could be required to employ armed force.
Despite the Pan American developments,Professor Perkins
warns against the conclusion that the Monroe Doctrine itself has
died in tie face of the growing emphasis on regional and more
strictly legal diplomacy. He states:
The result, of course, is the same. The United States
today, as in earlier times, will brook no European
invasion of this continent, no indirect control of
any Latin American state by another and alien power.
In the deepest sense, the Monroe Doctrine remains
today .... 2 6
Referring specifically to American diplomacy in the 1950's
and early 1960's, i.e., before the 1965 intervention in the
Dominican Republic, Perkins suggested the strong priority of
considerations of ideology and security over legal principles.
He candidly concludes:
as recent events have clearly demonstrated, the United
States will not permit the establishment of a Communist-
satellite state in the New World, or, to put the
matter more cautiously, will not permit any state to
associate itself so closely with Russia as to jeopardize
the security of the Americas. The fact has become
crystal-clear in this year [of the Cuban Missile Crisis]
1962.27
251 APPLICATIONS INTER-AMERICAN TREATY OF RECIPROCAL ASSIST-
ANCE 1948-1956 at 417-424 (1947). It was under the Pan American
Union treaty that the United States sought to justify its use
of force against Cuba in the missile crisis of 1962, and in
the Dominican Republic in 1965. These matters are the subject
of part IV sections B and C infra at 154, 160.
26D. PERKINS, supra note 11 at 370; see also DOZER, THE
MONROE DOCTRINE 204-(-965); see also WILBUR, THE MONROE DOCTRINE,
126 (1965).
2 7PERKINS, supra note 11, at 389.
Briefly summarzing, the main thrust of the Monroe Doctrine
seems to have been a warning to other nations that the United
States regarded its national interests of first importance in
the New World. Any significant extension of foreign influence
in the Western hemisphere was to be regarded as an unjustified
and intolerable threat to the United States. Pan-American de-
elopments of the 1930's brought the United States to reject
unilateral intervention and it brought the Latin American states
to accept the no-transfer principle. Nevertheless, it soon
became evident that the same Pan-American developments which began
with the renunciation of intervention had come to endorse the
new concept of regional right to intervene against both the
physical threat and ideological deviance. In the fifteen years
between 1954 and 1969 the non-intervention and no-transfer doc-
trines seem to have been expanded so that their warning is to
apply not only to "foreigners" but also to Latin American
nationals and parties which may be deemed sympathetic to dis-
favored "international" doctrines, such as Communism. Of course,
if these summarizations are valid, then the Pravda justification
is well "precedented" in American diplomacy. The case studies
which follow indicate that the United States' precedents for the
Soviet justification are not only part of the traditions of the
American republic, but also part of current American practice.
Furthermore the more modern precedents are not simply political
state diplomacy but have as their very basis contemporary American
legal diplomacy.
IV
RECENT PRECEDENTS IN UNITED STATES LEGAL DIPLOMACY
A. Communism in Guatemala: the Caracas Resolution (1954)
In early 1954,Washington became increasingly anxious over
Communist participation in the non-Communist Guatemalan govern-
ment. The United States went to the Caracas Conference of the
of the Organization of American States [hereinafter cited OAS]
with a response to the Guatemalan government's policy of in-
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creased permissiveness regarding Communist participation in
Guatemalan affairs. The United States proposed a resolution
characterizing, UCommunist control" of an American state a28
threat to peace.
In line with the pattern of United States hemispheric
policy which emerged in the 1930's and blossomed into regional
defense treaties and institutions in the 1940's, the United
States sought to multilateralize its concern about the foreign
influence of Communism in the hemisphere. This policy was con-
siderably extended by the Caracas Resolution which declared
that the domination or control of the political institutions of
any American state by the "international communist movement"
would constitute a threat to the "sovereignty and independence"
of the American states, endangering the peace, and calling for
appropriate OAS action under the Rio Treaty.
2 9
The resolution was passed despite a Mexican warning that
it would open the way for intervention in the domestic affairs
of Latin American states on the vague test that there was foreign
domination or control when a state was "only reorganizing its
economic system.''3 0 In addition, to the extent that the reso-
lution envisaged the use of force against a neighbor state, it
seems to have violated the spirit of the United Nations Charter
which outlaws the use of force to settle disputes.3 1 But, the
resolution was passed although apparently contrary to international
obligations and it eventually carried almost the authority of
regional law -- regional law which had defined international
communism, as anti-democratic and as a threat to the peace of
the American states.
28 48 Am.J.INT'L. L. Supp. at 123.
2 91nter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance supra,
note 25. Article 8 of the Treaty includes the "use of armed force"
as a possible measure.
3 0Fenwick, Intervention at the Caracas Conference, 48
AM.J.INT'L. L 451-53.
31U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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When revolution broke out in Guatemala in June 1954, a
Security Council resolution which would have had the effect of
giving United Nations authorization to the OAS to handle the
situation regionally was defeated by the Soviet veto. The
Soviet representative argued that the issue of revolution in
Guatemala was not a matter of only regional concern. Neverthe-
less, the OAS had already taken up the matter on its own ini-
tiative. In that forum, Guatemala urged that measures be taken
against her Latin American neighbors, Honduras and Nicaragua,
whom she accused of supporting the rebels in Guatemala. A
Meeting of Consultation under Article Six of the Rio Treaty was
scheduled to consider the danger to the peace posed by the inter-
vention of "international communism" in Guatemala. The success
of the rebels in ousting the incumbent government,which had per-
mitted the participation of Communists,made the meeting unneces-
sary. American officials were understandably pleased; the threat
of international communism in Guatemala had been controlled by
forces within the country, so regional intervention was unnec-
essary.
The principal point to be noted is that fourteen years
prior to the Soviet claim of right to invade Czechoslovakia the
United States had initiated an ideological definition of
"threat." In persuading the OAS to formally define domination by
"international communism" as a threat to the peace, the United
States gave the Soviet Union a precedent for its argument that
the ideology of "anti-socialism" in a socialist state is properly
considered a threat to its peace justifying a forceful inter-
vention by the other socialist states. Thus, the Caracas Res-
olution shows that the Soviets' ideological definition of "threat"
was not unprecedented.
B. The Cuban Missile Crisis (1962)32
In October 1962, when the presence of Soviet missile sites
3 2 The United States-sponsored invasion of Cuba at the Bay of
Pigs in 1961 is not treated here because it presented no asser-
tion of right for the intervention. The United States at first
denied its complicity in the invasion. Later the President
assumed full responsibility, but offered no legal justification.
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in Cuba was first established with certainty, the United States
government felt constrained to act. The official debate was
not over whether or not to act, but over precisely when and how
to act. Apparently the legal considerations and the legal Jus-
tification to be offered for the decision were considered
subordinate. The Office of the Legal Adviser of the Department
of State was not represented at the meetings of the Executive
Committee ofthe National Security Council where the decisions on
Cuba were made.3 3 Formal legal arguments were prepared as an
additional overall justification only after the Executive
Committee had narrowed the range of possible United States
responses to either an air strike or a blockade.
On October 22, President Kennedy addressed the nation to
describe the missile build-up in Cuba. He declared that the
new missile bases violated:
1) The Rio Treaty of collective self-defense,,3
4
2) The traditions of the United States and the hemis-
phere,3 5
3) A Joint Resolution of the eighty-seventh Congress,3
6
4) The Charter of the United Nations, and3 7
So, while both the Bay of Pigs and the Czech invasions represent
a great state's attempt to effect a change by force in the govern-
ment of an ideologically deviant neighbor-state, in terms of legal
diplomacy, the one offers no "precedent" for the other.
3 3 See E. ABEL, THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 46 (1966) for a
list of the original members and subsequent changes.
34 Supra note 25.
3 5 Apparently this is a reference to the Monroe Doctrine and
to the various inter-American developments from the 1930'sdis-
cussed supra Part III at 147.
3 A Congressional Resolution, of course, has no effect on
the issue of international legality. Presumably it was included
primarily to indicate that the Chief Executive's policy was
previously declared and supported by the Congress.
37 The reference is apparently to U.N. CHARTER art. 2 para. 4
which states: All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial
integrity or political independence on any state, or in any
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.
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5) Principles of international stability.
3 8
President Kennedy declared the Soviet-Cuban missile build-up
to be a "deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the
status quo" which the United States could not accept if American
commitments would ever be trusted again.3 9 The President
pledged the United States to obtaining the withdrawal of the
missiles from Cuba. The President announced that he had already
directed the following steps:
1) The imposition of a strict "quarantine" on all
offensive military equipment bound for Cuba,
2) The continuance of close surveillance of Cuba,
3) The immediate calling of a meeting of the Organ-
ization of American States "to consider this
threat" and to invoke the Rio Treaty in support
of all necessary action,
4) The request for an emergency meeting of the Se-
curity Council "to take action against this la-
test Soviet threat to world peace."
The President directed the forceful quarantine and close
surveillance of Cuba before any consultation with the OAS and
without any discussion or authorization from United Nations.
The United States unilaterally announced and executed its plans
to deploy its armed forces around Cuba before attempting any
peaceful settlement of the dispute. An OAS meeting was called
for the following day.
Although it is at least arguable that the missile build-up
violated the Rio Treaty, hemispheric traditions, a Congress-
ional Resolution, and principles of stability, it is difficult
to fashion a persuasive argument to the effect that the build-
3 8Most students of the crisis seem to believe the missiles
were bound to elicit a United States response, and in that sense,
did upset international stability. See,e.g., the comments of
Myres McDougal, AM.J.INT'L. L. Proceedings, 1963.
391962 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES
806-809.
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up violated the United Nations Charter. Even if the threat
the build-up posed was a "threat" under article 2, paragraph 4
of the Charter, the United States still was bound by its obli-
gations under article 2 paragraphs 3 and 4:
3. All members shall settle their international dis-
putes by peaceful means in such a manner that in-
ternational peace and security, and justice, are
not endangered.
4. All members shall refrain in their international
relations from the threat or use of force against
the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent
with the Purposes of the United Nations,
No clause in the United Nations Charter relieves a state from
these prohibitions, even if another state has threatened to use
force,except in the case of an armed attack.
41
Because of the weakness of the argument that there was a
threat under the Charter, the United States also premised its
legal justification on the Regional Arrangements Chapter42 of
the Charter. Since the OAS met the following day, endorsed the
"quarantine," and joined the United States in the call for the
missiles' withdrawal, the United States was largely relieved of
the task of defending its original threat of force as a uni-
lateral move. The United States was then able to proceed in the
exercise of its legal diplomacy to defend its actions under
Chapter VIII provisions for the settlement of disputes through
40While U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4, makes a threat of force
unlawful, it is questionable how Soviet missiles in Cuba were a
"threat" in the Charter sense any more than are Soviet missiles
in Russia or than American missiles in Turkey. See Wright,
The Cuban Quarantine, 57 AM.J.INT'L L. 548-553 (1i-3).
41 Art. 51 of the Charter recognizes the right to use force
in self-defense 'tif an armed attack occurs." McDougal and Feli-
ciano in LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, 233-40 (1961),
suggest that the right of "anticipatory self-defense" existing
under customary international law may still exist under the U.N.
Charter, but even if that is so, no such right could be claimed
for either the Cuban blockade or the Czech invasion for there was
no imminence of attack by either Cuba or Czechoslovakia. Neither
was imminence of attack alleged in either case although in both
cases there seemed to be fear of increased susceptibility to attack.
42U.N. CHARTER, Chapter VIII, arts. 52-54.
regional arrangements.4 3 While'Chapter VIII was originally put
into the United Nations Charter with the American states pre-
dominantly in mind, it was never before employed by the OAS as
an explanation of "right" justifying the actual employment of
regional armed forces against a member state. Indeed, the clear
language of articles 52 through 54 seems to counter any such
claim. Article 52, paragraph 1, authorizes the existence of
"regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters
relating to the maintenance of international peace and security
as are appropriate for regional action...."
What is "appropriate for regional action" is clarified by
article 52, paragraph 2:
The Members of the United Nations entering into such
arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make
every effort to achieve Pacific Settlement of local
disputes through such regional arrangements or by such
regional ,gencies before referring them to the Security
Council.4
Article 52, paragraph 3 reinforces the point that what is appro-
priate for regional action is the peaceful settlement of regional
disputes. Any further doubt is put to rest by the express lang-
uage of article 53, paragraph 1, which provides that no "en-
forcement action" may be taken by a regional agency without
United Nations authorization.4 5 Article 54 adds the requirement
that the Security Council "be kept fully informed of activities
undertaken or in contemplation....
3See Cheyes, The Legal Case for U.S. Action in Cuba, 47
DEP'T STATE BULL. 763 (1962).
44U.N. CHARTER art. 52, para. 2.
45U.N. CHARTER art. 53 para 1 states:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize
such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement
action under its authority. But no enforcement action
shall be taken under regional arrangements or by re-
gional agencies without the authorization of the Se-
curity Council.
46U.N. CHARTER art. 54.
Nevertheless, the United States maintained that the OAS
action was justified in terms of Chapter VIII as a proper re-
gional response to a member states threat to the region. To
get around the provisions which limit regional authority to
the use of peaceful measures and expressly make unlawful any
enforcement action without United Nations authorization, the
United States Department of State presented three arguments:
1) The "quarantine" was not "enforcement action" be-
cause it was not regional action which was obli-
gatory on OAS members, but only recommendatory,
Therefore, no authorization was required.47
2) "Authorization" did not mean PRIOR authorization.
3) Authorization was given by the Security Council
"constructively" by virtue of the fact that the
Council did not condemn the United States--OAS
action.48
In resting its case on these rather doubtful arguments the
United States chose a novel legal justification for its action.
4 9
Documenting the events of the missile crisis, one writer noted
the United States did not employ the more traditional argument
of "self-defense against attack" preserved in article 51 of
the United Nations Charter lest it provide the Soviet Union an
open-ended precedent upon which to base its use of force against
its socialist neighbor-states by loose interpretation of "attack"
and "self-defense."
5 0
Nevertheless, the United States appears to have accomplished
what it had tried to avoid. It provided precedents in its legal
diplomacy which could be used to defend Czech-type suppressions
47This argument was based on Advisory Opinion on Certain
Expenses of the United Nations, E1962] I.C.J. 151; the opinion is
digested in 56 AN. J. INT'L. L. 1053 (1962).
48 Meeker, Defensive Quarantine and the Law 57 AM.J.INT'L. L.
515-524 (1963).
49The arguments on both sides of the debate on the legality
of such assertions are discussed in Wright, The Cuban Quarantine,
57 AM. J. INT'L. L. 558-559 (1963).
50E. ABEL, supra note 33, at 115.
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as long as the action taken could be multilateralized so as to
be made in regional concert.
Following these American precedents, the Soviets could
argue that the invasion of Czechoslovakia 1) was not"enforcement
action" under the United Nations Charter because it was not ob-
ligatory,but only recommendatory, on the fraternal socialist
states, and therefore no authorization was required; 2) that,
in any event, the required authorization need not be prior
authorization;and 3) that, in fact, authorization was given con-
structively since the Security Council never formally condemned
the invasion. Indeed, these "precedents" were boldly pre-
sented by the United States as sound principles of international
law. These same points of legal argument were not specifically
used in the Pravda justification. But the Soviet justification
may have been inspired by the general precedents of a regional
claim of right to employ force against a neighbor-state which is
allegedly threatening the security of the region.
C. The Dominican Intervention (1965)
In 1965, the United States showed that it did not limit
the application of its claims of regional right to use force
against a neighbor state to cases involving physical threats.
Armed intervention on the grounds of ideological deviancy pro-
vided startling new international precedents.
The government of the Dominican Republic fell in the early
hours of a revolution in the spring of 1965.51 The rebels
announced the return of Juan Bosch -- the country's first con-
stitutionally elected leader,who had been deposed several years
earlier. Air Force units opposed the return of Bosch and were
resisting the take-over. President Johnson ordered a United
States Navy "evacuation" task force to land on the island to pro-
vde protection for American and other nationals whom the authori-
ties in Santo Domingo declared they could not protect. After
5 1 For a factual account of events, see: CENTER FOR STRA-
TEGIC STUDIES, DOMINICAN ACTION - 1965 (1966); THE HAMMARSKJOLD
FORUMS, THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC CRISIS 1965 (1967).
controlling the capital for three days, the pro-Bosch rebels
partially withdrew leaving the country with no apparent leader-
ship and in a situation of continued fighting. The Air Force
set up a ruling junta, announced democratic intentions, and
asked the United States to send Marines to put down the "Commu-
nist" directed rebellion. Later that day, the United States am-
bassador to the Dominican Republic sent a recommendation to
Washington that Marine protection be provided for the evacuation
and United States Embassy. In addition, he advised the United
States government to consider "armed intervention which goes
beyond the mere protection of Americans..." to prevent "another
Cuba.,,52
U.S. officials in Washington had been considering just such
a move. Two days after the initial American forces landed in the
Dominican Republic, the United States increased the Marines and
sent airborn units. New York Times correspondent Tad Szulc
reported that "a high ranking United States naval officer" had
declared that the function of the Marines- was not only to pro-
tect the evacuation proceedings, but also "to see that no
Communit government is established in the Dominican Republic."53
Later that day, President Johnson referred to the Dominicans
as "our fellow citizens of this hemisphere," and spoke of the dan-
ger to them and to foreign nationals. "Meanwhile," the President
went on to say, "there are signs that people trained outside the
Dominican Republic are seeking to gain control." In words
recalling the Monroe Doctrine,the President gave assurances that
the United States would not permit the peoples of the hemisphere
t' fall prey to international conspiracy from any quarter.
President Johnson addressed the nation-again on May 3rd
to announce that Communists had taken control of the Dominican
rebellion,5l The President referred to the OAS Punta del Este
5 2See MARTIN, OVERTAKEN BY EVENTS (1966).
5 3N.Y. Times, April 30, 1965.
54 1965-1 PUBLIC PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED
STATES 461.
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declaration of January 1962, 5 5 and affirmed that the principles
of Communism are "incompatible with the principles of the Inter-
American system." The goal of his government, the President
declared, was "to prevent another Communist state in'this hemi-
sphere."
5 6
After the events of the Dominican crisis had calmed, the
State Department prepared a list of Communists involved in the
"civil war."5 7 Convincing documentation of their control of
the rebellion was never given. For, in the meantime, the admini-
stration shifted its legal justification to the ground that the
rebellion might have become Communist had the United States not
intervened. The United States, it was argued in retrospect by
the Office of the Legal Adviser, had acted to preserve the legal
4ght of the OAS to act. 5 8 Even the former Legal Adviser, Abram
Chayes, and his colleagues who collected and analyzed the legal
dcuments following upon the Dominican crisis, observed that
"this argument may have sounded somewhat cynical, especially in
view of the strenuous United States efforts to secure OAS en-
dorsement of its actiono0"
5 9
Also of interest in the "Opinion of the Legal Adviser" is
the following statement which was partially echoed in the Pravda
article:
The United States refused to observe merely the form
of legalistic procedures to the detriment of funda-
mental rights of a nation under the OAS Charter.60
5 5See Final Act, Second Punta del Este Conference (Eighth
Meeting of Consultation of OAS Foreign Ministers), January, 1962.
56Id.
5 7THE CENTER FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, supra note 48,at 65.
58United States Department of State mimeographed distri-
bution (unpublished) of May 7, 1965, entitled "Legal Basis For
the United States Actions in the Dom. Rep." This document is
cited in 2 CHAYESEHRLICHLOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROCESS, at 1173f (1968).
592 CHAYESEHRLICH,LOWENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL PROCESS
Problem XV at 1184 (1968).
600pinion of the Legal Adviser, Department of State, May
7, 1965.
163
Apparently recognizing the feebleness of its strictly legal
points the Opini continued:
Participation in the Inter-American system, to be
meaningful, must take into account the modern day
reality that an attempt by a conspiratorial group
inspired from the outside to seize control by force
can be an assault upon the independence and integrity
of a state. The rights and obligations of all mem-
bers of the OAS must be viewed in light of this reality.61
(Emphasis added.)
It is reported that there was considerable debate within the
United States government as to whether, or not, the Opinion of
the Legal Adviser should be published at all, given the wide-
spread criticism of the "legality" it argued.6 2 Apparently,
it was finally decided that the failure to offer any legal jus-
tification would hurt the United States position in the United
Nations and OAS and would gravely damage the American image as
a nation committed to the rule of law.
The United States won OAS support for its intervention by
the bare two-thirds vote required; this required the votes of
the United States and of the Dominican Republic. But even the
common course agreed upon by the OAS was as much a criticism of
the initially unilateral United States intervention as it was
an endorsement. The resolution stated:
WHEREAS,
.o. The formation of an inter-American force will sig-
nify ipso facto the transformation of the forces pre-
sehtly in Dominican territory into another force that
would not be that of one state or of a group of states
but that of the Organization of American States, an
interstatal organization, which organization is charged
with the responsibility of interpreting the democratic
will of its members.... it63
6 1Supra note 55.
62CHAYES, et-al., supra note 59, at 1186.
63Act Establishing Inter-Ametican Force, Tenth Meeting of
Consultation. Meeting of OAS Foreign Ministers.
This resolution did not ratify the unilateral United States
action, nor did it endorse the claim of right of the United
States to intervene for the OAS in urgent situations. It said,-
in effect, that the national forces of the United States would be
repaced by forces of OAS--the regional organization with the re-
sponsibility for taking regional action. 6 4 It is striking that.
the OAS resolution carried no reference to Communism--the
basic allegation in the United States justification of its in-
tervention. The initial intervention by the United States alone
was not endorsed, as such, the OAS simply transformed the United
States forces then in the Dominican Republic into OAS forces.
The Secretary General of the United Nations, U Thant,
addressed himself to the implications of the regional action by
the OAS.6 5 The Secretary General expressed the view that the
OAS had set an embarrassing and dangerous precedent. He ex-
pressed hisfears that similar "rights" might be claimed by
other groups of states. Specifically he noted the danger that
the Arab League, which is perhaps more an ethnic than a regional
organization,might employ the OAS in an action against Israel.
6 6
On the day after the Secretary General expressed his ominous
misgivings, the President of the United States seemed to accept
the "reciprocity" implications of such "regional action." The
President asserted that the right of a people to decide the fate
of their state rests only "partly" with the people of that coun-
try and "partly with their neighbors. 6 7
In 1965 the Soviets, through their representative to the
United Nations Security Council, Fedbrenko; based their rejec-
tion of arguments favoring regional action on the principle
64 Nevertheless, it may be said that the OAS did not formally
renounce the U.S. action "on its behalf." Theoretically, the
United States could cite this non-condemnation and assert a
legal right to act for the OAS on the grounds that it was
"authorized" to do so because it was not condemned for its
Dominican action.
65Supra note 5.
67Address by President Johnson, Baylor University, May 28,
1965.
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of the sovereign independence of states. Specifically, the
Soviets advanced the following arguments:
1) Such regional employment of force violated Article
2 of the United Nations Charter,
2) As per Article 29 of the Charter, only the Security
Council can determine threats to the peace, and
3) Article 53 prohibits any regional enforcement action6 8
"without the authorization of the Security Council."
Yet despite this initial rebuke to the United States-OAS
"precedents," the Soviet Pravda justification followed the
general rationale of those U.S. "precedents" to the effect:
1) that not too much weight is to be given to formal-
istic judicial reasoning as applied to the United
Nations Charter,
2) that regional (or "fraternal") organizations are
competent to determine threats to the peace and to
take forceful action against deviant neighbor-
states, and
3) that such regional actions are not to be frustrated
by United Nations interference.
So, wlilein 1965 there had been American precedent and Soviet
dissent,in 1968 the Soviets appeared to concur in the principle
developed and asserted by the American precedents: ideological
deviancy in a neighbor-state can constitute a threat to the
peace which the larger grouping of states has a "right" to
suppress with armed forces if necessary.
CONCLUSION
The degree to which the Monroe Doctrine and the Caracas,
Cuban, and Dominican "precedents" may have influenced the Pravda
justification for the socialist states' invasion of Czechoslo-
vakia may never be known. However, one's sense of outrage at the
6 8Security Council Debates, 20 U.N. SCOR (1965).
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Soviet action and arguments of legality must be somewhat
numbed by the recognition that the socialist claim of right
to intervene against the forces of anti-socialism does not go
much beyond American claims of right to intervene against
Communism.
We are encouraged to hope that legal diplomacy will be more
than the servant of political diplomacy, by the present Legal
Adviser, Leonard Meeker, who has stated:
If we are struck today by the existence of inter-
national discord and open conflict in the world, we
should reflect for a moment on the change in intel-
lectual climate which has been occurring even in our
own time. Intellectual climate is important. While
it may not govern the events of today, it creates the
premises and assumptions of tomorrow and forms the
matrix of next year's decisions and actions.6 9
Thus, we should ponder the implications 6f asserting for regional
organizations the authority that was assumed by the OAS'in the
Dominican crisis.
7 0
It is submitted that the United States is too influential
in the international system not to consider how the legal pre-
cedents whth it propounds are going to influence international
norms. The reciprocity principle has at least an implicit
pervasiveness,and precedents in United States legal diplomacy
will therefore inevitably diminish the criticism that can other-
wise be levelled against contorted claims by other states.
If more lawful international conduct is to be demandedof
states, the existene of the reciprocity-principle must be recog-
nized and American legal diplomacy must be grounded on sounder.-
principles of law than those in the precedents reviewed here.
Until this happens, the law will continue to follow events in-
stead of governing them.
6 9 Meeker, Prospects of Law in a World of Conflict, 52
DEPT. STATE BULL. 900.
7 0 See U Thant, Interview, supra note 5.
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